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GIVE ME A HOME WHERE NO SALESMEN
PHONE: TELEPHONE SOLICITATION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
by Susan Burnett Luten*
Introduction
The telephone is an instrument with a unique capacity to intrude.
Unlike no other medium of communication, the telephone reaches into
virtually every home and workspace in the nation. Until very recently,
unsolicited calls, including wrong numbers, crank calls and solicita-
tions, were regarded as a necessary annoyance. Wrong numbers and
crank calls are perhaps inherent hazards of the system, but technology
has caught up with telephone solicitation, and for some, annoyance has
given way to outrage.' A 1978 California survey commissioned by the
Pacific Telephone Company revealed that only .1% of the population
"likes" to receive unsolicited calls.2 Yet residential telephone subscrib-
ers continue to receive them in increasingly annoying numbers.3
The convenience of the telephone and the efficiency of the com-
puter have created the Automatic Dialing and Recorded Message
Player ("ADRMP"). For less than $1,200 one can purchase a com-
puter-recorder capable of calling sixty households per hour, complete
with a recorded solicitation and blank tape on which the telephone sub-
scriber may records his response.' Should the subscriber hang up, the
computer is unable to disconnect the line. Depending upon the service
* B.A., 197 1, University of California, Santa Barbara; member third year class.
1. See Congressional Record, H.R. 9505-06, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
E6213 (1977) (Introductory Remarks by Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin).
2. Field Research Corp., The California Public's Experience With and Attitude To-
ward Unsolicited Telephone Calls at 9 (Mar. 1978) (survey conducted for Pacific Telephone
Co., on file in Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n File No. 01112).
3. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978 at 67. The number of calls placed is
staggering: "Every day telephone solicitors place 7 million calls, selling $28,000,000 in prod-
ucts.. . " BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978 at 26.
4. For example, Dictaphone Corporation offers the Dictaphone 1650 ($1,195 retail).
The maximum recordable message is 150 seconds, with an unlimited response tape. The
estimate of 60 calls per hour is based on a one-minute call. "The most sophisticated gear can
ask a series of questions, record the responses, and tabulate the results itself. Some new
equipment can even detect a 'no' answer, and then begin a revised line of questions." Busi-
NESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 27.
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area, the phone may be inoperative for the duration of the message.5
In addition, virtually every model can be easily modified by the user to
dial at random every number in a given sequence, so that even individ-
uals with unlisted telephone numbers will not be missed.6 Operating
over several time zones with the use of a WATS 7 line, ADRMPs are
capable of making from 1,000 calls per day' to 130,000 calls per
month.9 This can be accomplished at a cost of six cents per call if a
human operator is used to begin each message, or less that one cent for
a fully automated call.'° Indeed, the low cost of such calls indicate that
5. Some telephone companies do provide a disconnect feature which automatically
clears the line within 10 to 42 seconds after the subscriber hangs up. Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Decision No. 88770, Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion Into the Use
of the Public Utility Telephone System for Telephone Solicitations, Advertising, by Auto-
matic Dialing-announcing Devices for Solicitation or Announcements to Residential Tele-
phones, Interim Opinion 10 (May 2, 1978) (filed Feb. 22, 1978, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n File
No. 01111) [Hereinafter cited as Interim Opinion].
Not all subscribers receive this feature, however. For example. while 85% of Pacific
Telephone customers are provided this service, only 20% of General Telephone subscribers
have the disconnect feature. The remaining General Telephone customers could be pro-
vided the disconnect feature at an estimated cost of $5,800,000. This cost would be passed
along to the consuming public. .d. at 8-10.
The disconnect feature works as follows: if a telephone without it is called by an
ADRMP and the subscriber hangs up, the line will be inoperative until the message is com-
pleted. If a telephone with the disconnect feature is called by an ADRMP, however, and the
subscriber hangs up, the line will clear when the 10 to 42 seconds elapse. If the subscriber
picks up the receiver during the 10 to 42 second disconnect period, however, the disconnect
feature terminates, and the elapsed time must begin to accumulate again when the receiver is
hung up.
The effect of having an inoperative phone for even a short period of time can be cata-
strophic. A Minneapolis woman whose mother had suffered a heart attack was about to call
an ambulance when the phone rang and a computerized sales pitch began. Her phone was
not equipped with a disconnect feature and she was unable to clear the line to make her
emergency call. Her mother finally received medical aid-but only after the daughter used a
neighbor's phone. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978 at 67.
6. Interim Opinion, supra note 5, at 4-5, 7. Representatives from Telesystems and
Kosco, manufacturers of electronic telephone solicitation equipment, pointed out that such
use by solicitors, while technically possible, would be counterproductive, since it angers the
public and ties up the lines of large businesses, governmental agencies, and police and fire
stations.
7. Wide Area Telephone Service.
8. The Dycan 1000 has a capacity of 1,000 calls per day through the simultaneous use
of four telephone lines. Interim Opinion, supra note 5, at 4.
9. The Dycan 25000 has a capacity of 130,000 calls per month. Id. "[I]f you had 193
of them, they would be able to call every home in the U.S. once a week." Congressman Les
Aspin, quoted in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 1978 at 44.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978 at 67. Sellers and users of ADRMPs
generally support the use of operators to initiate calls and ascertain the subscriber's interest
before beginning the recorded message. But six calls may be made without supervision for
each call with supervision, suggesting significant financial incentive to use fully automated
machines. Interim Opinion, supra note 5 at 4, 5-6, 7. Some companies lease time on
ADRMPs and sell a complete service package which may increase the price per completed
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they can easily replace solicitations made by mail."
The implications of this technology are far-reaching in terms of
the potential for unwarranted intrusions upon individual privacy. 2
One result is that isolated facts concerning an individual can be gath-
ered and coordinated in a vast computer data network for use by com-
mercial businesses. The same sophistication and techniques employed
in the development of mailing lists'3 can be applied to the compiling of
telephone number lists, which in turn can be stored in computers linked
to ADRMP systems.' 4 Such telephone lists may contain much more
information about an individual than merely his or her name and ad-
dress.' 5 They may, for instance, contain data on one's socioeconomic
status, political party registration, place of employment and occupa-
tion, type of car, past purchases and credit rating. With such informa-
tion instantaneously retrievable from a computer databank,
businessmen, political organizations and charities have the capacity to
compile computer files about each American buyer and tailor their so-
licitation to increase the liklihood of achieving the desired result.' 6 In
call to $1.50. Services may include script writers to prepare the message, professional an-
nouncers to record it, development of market research areas and operation of the ADRMP
itself. Under this service, approximately 50 calls may be completed each hour. Id. at 5-6.
11. "As postal rates increase, these sophisticated, automated talking and listening ma-
chines will surely replace solicitations via mail." "Junk Calls," Parade, Feb. 5, 1978, at 19
(Sunday newspaper supplement).
12. The implications of the use of electronic telephone solicitations may go far beyond
unwanted telephone calls: "[M]any people have voiced concern that the computer, with its
insatiable appetite for information, its image of infallibility, and its inability to forget any-
thing that has been stored in it, may become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn
society into a transparent world in which our homes, our finances, and our associations will
be bared to a wide range of casual observers, including the morbidly curious and the mali-
ciously or commercially intrusive." A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 3 (1971).
13. Note, Subscription List Sales and the Elusive Right ofPrivacy, 62 IOWA L. REV. 591
(1976). See note 15 infra.
14. Indeed, computer interaction is already a reality: "Computers can be linked to-
gether so that data on an individual can be gathered from across the nation and from a
variety of sources to give a comprehensive picture of his finances, employment, schooling,
and reputation over a lifetime." Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZAGA L.REv. 587, 598
(1977).
15. Subscription lists are so specialized that brokers sell catalogues with the names of
other brokers who compile lists from hospital records of births and professional directories.
Such a catalogue can include over 1,800 separate list brokers. Subscrption List Sales andthe
Elusive Right of Privacy, supra note 13 at 598-99.
16. The sophistication of information-profiling of individuals is extraordinary. Per-
sonal data contained in data banks "can be cross-indexed with other relevant elements to
form a context of interpretation. Random facts about an individual may appear meaning-
less or innocuous when considered in isolation. When aggregated and interrelated with
other facts, they form a composite 'data profile' from which one can draw conclusions and
make decisions." Bouvard & Bouvard, Computers and Individual Rights, in THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY 26 (G. McClellan, ed. 1976). The use of computer data banks has already been
adapted to the mail solicitation industry where "mass consumer mailings have become in-
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some areas where ADRMPs have been used, for example, the machines
have obtained sales in half the calls placed.'7 The unavoidable by-
product of any such system is increased disruption of the home by the
unsolicited call. 8 Any solicitor with a computer-selected sales pitch
and method of delivery is virtually certain to have at least some impact
on the subscriber; even if the listener hangs up, the contact has been
made. Indeed, public reaction from those who have rceived calls from
ADRMPs has been consistently negative. Not one favorable letter was
sent to the California Public Utilities Commission during its recent six-
month investigation of telephone solicitation. One person, writing in
protest of ADRMPs, suggested that one be programmed to call legisla-
tors, telephone company executives, ADRMP sellers and users-
perhaps fifty times a day-as a lobbying effort to restrict their use.
The psychological impact of this contact, coupled with the techno-
logical efficiency and low cost involved in making the contact, suggests
that the telephone subscribers are in need of some type of legislative
protection. Not surprisingly, ADRMPs are the subject of five congres-
sional bills'9 and proposed regulations or legislation in twenty-four
states."a The Federal Trade Commission2' has undertaken a six-month
investigation of direct telephone solicitation. Any regulations restrict-
ing the free use of the telephone would, however, undoubtedly evoke
First Amendment challenges on the ground that the regulations restrict
the caller's freedom of speech.
A message delivered by means of a telephone is quite clearly
speech, and therefore merits First Amendment protection. But even
speech which is thus protected is still subject to regulation through
time, place and manner restrictions. Regulation of the telephone as a
means of delivering a message, such that the message is in certain cir-
cumstances prohibited from being delivered, may at first glance by
viewed as a restriction of the speech itself, subject to challenge on First
Amendment grounds. Alternatively, such regulations may be recog-
creasingly selective under the watchful eye of electronic hardware. Computers have made it
feasible carefully to match up product profiles with consumer profiles to increase mailing
efficiency." MEDIA/SCOPE, Nov. 1968 at 86.
17. Barringer, Automated Phone-Dialing Ban Approved by Mar, land House, Wash. Post,
Mar. 1, 1978, § C, at I.
18. At a hearing in early 1978 in Annapolis, Maryland on the subject of legislation to
ban ADRMPs, State House Delegate Marilyn Goldwater observed: "You could be
swamped with 10, 20 or even 30 recorded calls in a day. You could lose control of your own
telephone in your own home." Id. at col. 2.
19. See note 157 infra.
20. See note 159 infra.
21. Since state legislation may not prevent the use of ADRMPs or traditional solicita-
tions across state lines, the Federal Trade Commission has completed the six-month investi-
gation and is considering national regulation. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978
at 67. See also BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978 at 26.
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nized as mere limitations on the manner of delivery. The message pro-
hibited from delivery by telephone may still be communicated through
other means, such as by printed or electronic media or through the
mails. Another constitutional challenge to such regulations could be
based upon the theory that a willing listener has a right to receive infor-
mation and hence cannot be prohibited from receiving certain
messages because of their content. This challenge can be met by enact-
ing carefully drawn legislation which allows a willing listener to receive
the desired message.
The regulation of telephone solicitation is a problem of first im-
pression, but an argument in support of restrictive legislation can be
supported by an analysis of analogous questions which have reached
the United States Supreme Court. This note will examine time, place
and manner regulations as they have been developed in light of the
First Amendment. It will then discuss the limitations on the protection
of commercial speech and will seek to develop a doctrine of residential
privacy. Various types of legislative proposals will be analyzed in light
of these principles. Finally, it will propose a statutory model for the
restriction of telephone solicitation.
I. First Amendment Considerations in Limiting
Telephone Solicitation
The First Amendment does not protect speech in all contexts and
at all times.22 Chief Justice Holmes provided the now classic example
when he noted that even "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and caus-
ing a panic."23 Thus, despite the absolute language of the First
Amendment,24 the Constitution will tolerate time, place and manner
restrictions as a method of regulating otherwise protected speech.25
A. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
A draft protester was arrested for burning his draft card on the
22. For example, obscenity, fighting words, defamation and incitement are not pro-
tected. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chaplinski v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
23. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Schenck involved the first applica-
tion of the "clear and present danger test" to the restriction of speech otherwise entitled to
protection under the First Amendment. Id.
24. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S.
CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
25. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
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courthouse steps in United States v. O'Brien.26 He claimed that the law
prohibiting the burning of draft cards abridged his freedom of expres-
sion. Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice War-
ren outlined the prerequisites to limiting First Amendment rights:
This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms. . . .[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.27
The Court examined the governmental interest in prohibiting the burn-
ing of draft cards and found it sufficient to affirm O'Brien's convic-
tion.28
The appellant in Grayned v. City of Rockford 29 was arrested during
a demonstration in front of a school yard and convicted of violating
municipal antipicketing and antinoise ordinances. Grayned challenged
the constitutionality of both ordinances. The antipicketing ordinance
was invalidated as violative of equal protection, and the conviction on
this charge was reversed.3" In examining the overbreadth challenge to
the antinoise ordinance, however, the Supreme Court reiterated that
"reasonable 'time, place and manner,' regulations may be necessary to
further significant governmental interests, and are permitted."'" The
Court considered "the question of how to accomodate First Amend-
ment rights with the 'special characteristics of the school environ-
ment.' "32 Schools are a particular source of conflict since they "are
often the focus of significant grievances" 33 and yet also require "an un-
disrupted school session conducive to the students' learning . . .-.
The Court concluded that, given these conflicting interests, "Rockford's
modest restriction on some peaceful picketing represents a considered
26. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
27. Id. at 376-77.
28. The Court concluded that the prohibition against burning draft cards served to pre-
serve proof of registration for the draft, facilitate communication between individuals and
their draft boards, remind the holder of his obligations, and complete a regulatory scheme to
prevent abuse of draft cards. Id. at 378-80.
29. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 115.
32. Id. at 117, citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
33. 408 U.S. at 118.
34. Id. at 119.
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and specific legislative judgment that some kinds of expressive activity
should be restricted at a particular time and place, here in order to
protect the schools.""5 Thus, Grayned's challenge to the. antinoise ordi-
nance failed. The Grayned Court left open the question of whether
other areas also constitute "special environments" entitled to greater
degrees of protection. In a later section, this note will examine the
trend of recent cases dealing with the home as a special environment
requiring greater protection from disruptive intrusion.
One question not addressed by the majority opinions in O'Brien
and Grayned was what the result in those cases would have been had
the speakers been completely foreclosed from delivering their
messages. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in O'Brien emphasized
his understanding that the majority opinion "does not foreclose consid-
eration of First Amendment claims on those rare instances when an
'incidental' restriction upon expression. . . in practice has the effect of
entirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience
with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate."36 Since
O'Brien could have reached his audience in other ways, such a claim
was not appropriate, and the demonstration in Grayned similarly could
have been staged elsewhere. Yet Justice Harlan's concurrence made it
clear that a time, place and manner restriction on speech may in fact
operate as an absolute prohibition.
A speaker who can reach an audience through various media can-
not claim that a prohibition which eliminates one medium abridges his
right of free speech. On the other hand, one who is effectively prohib-
ited from delivering his message could claim an abridgement of his
First Amendment rights. Users of ADRMPs might claim that legisla-
tion restricting telephone solicitation would force them to use other,
perhaps more expensive, means of delivering their message. As they
would be able nonetheless to communicate through the use of other
media, such a claim should fail.37
Characterizing such regulation of telephone solicitation as mere
time, place and manner restrictions would not answer all of the poten-
tial constitutional challenges, however. Regulations of telephone solic-
itation may purport to restrict only commercial calls, thereby raising
the issue of constitutional protection for commercial speech. The next
section will explore the validity of those challenges based on the recent
case law extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech.
35. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
36. 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. The only context in which this claim might succeed would be a situation in which a
message could only be communicated by telephone. Such a situation seems very remote,
however, given the wide variety of alternative media for communication.
Fall 1979]
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B. First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech
Supporters of telephone solicitation invariably claim that restric-
tions on commercial calls would be unconstitutional under recent
Supreme Court decisions extending First Amendment protection to
commercial speech.3" This claim is misleading because the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech does not exempt it
from restrictions, such as those based on time, place and manner, which
may be constitutionally applied to all speech. The claim is inaccurate
because it implies that the extent of the protection has been clearly de-
fined by the Court, when in fact the cases merely suggest the minimum
standards for protecting commercial speech. As the following analysis
demonstrates, the recognition of First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech does not preclude its restriction or limitation.
Commercial speech until recently was considered outside the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, in the same category as fighting words,
obscenity and incitement.39 This view was based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 ° where the Court stated
that a solicitation which was commercial in nature was not afforded
constitutional protection.41 Three recent cases have severely narrowed,
if not overruled Chrestensen.42 In Bigelow v. Virginia,43 a managing
editor of a New York newspaper which printed an informational ad-
vertisement for an abortion referral service was convicted of violating a
Virginia law making it a misdemeanor to encourage procurement of an
abortion. The Virginia Supreme Court had upheld the conviction
based on Chrestensen,4 but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
'[t]he fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper
had commercial aspects. . . did not negate all First Amendment guar-
38. In a magazine interview, for example, one proponent stated that "[t]he Supreme
Court has ruled in many cases that companies have a right to freedom of commercial
speech", implying an absolute protection of commercial speech. Murray Roman, Chairman,
Campaign Communications Institute of America, quoted in U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP.,
Sept. 11, 1978 at 43.
39. See cases cited at note 19 supra.
40. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
41. Id. at 54-55.
42. In a 1975 decision, the Court distinguished Valentine and drastically limited its
scope: "[T]he holding is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance was upheld as a reasonable
regulation of manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The fact that it
had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is authority
for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from con-
stitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that
advertising is unprotected; per se." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975) (foot-
note omitted).
43. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
44. Id. at 819.
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antees."45 Fighting words, obscenity and incitement were distinguished
as clearly beyond constitutional protection, 46 but, particularly due to
the informational character of the advertisement at issue it was clear
that such speech merited some degree of First Amendment protection.
Exactly how much protection it deserved, however, was not explicitly
defined in Bigelow.
In a subsequent case, Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council,4 7 the Court examined a Virginia law which declared a
pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct if he advertised prescrip-
tion drug prices. The Court held that "[w]hatever may be the proper
bounds of time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech,
they are plainly exceeded by this Virginia statute, which singles out
speech of a particular content and seeks to prevent its dissemination
completely. ' '48 The Court held that such commercial speech was enti-
tled to protection under the First Amendment, due to its function of
"serv[ing] individual and societal interests in assuring informed and re-
liable decisionmaking."4 9 The Court thus once again emphasized the
importance of preserving the free flow of information directed to the
consumer.
The Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of-Arizona5 ° arose from
disciplinary action brought by the State Bar of Arizona against two
attorneys who, in order to maintain high volume in a low-cost legal
clinic, advertised their services in a local newspaper. Such advertising
violated a state bar rule, and the Special Local Administrative Com-
mittee recommended suspension for six months. Upon review, the
Board of Governors of the State Bar recommended a one-week suspen-
sion. The attorneys sought review by the Supreme Court of Arizona on
the ground that their First Amendment rights had been infringed. The
state Supreme Court rejected this claim.5 The Supreme Court re-
versed. Citing, inter alia, Bigelow and Virginia Board ofPharmacy, and
evaluating the public policy in favor of informed consumerism, the
Court ruled "simply that the flow of such information may not be re-
strained."5" These three cases read together affirm the existence of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech, although the ex-
tent of the protection is not yet clear. 3
45. Id. at 818.
46. Id. at 819.
47. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
48. Id. at 771.
49. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citation omitted).
50. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
51. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
52. 433 U.S. at 384.
53. "In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiated from other forms. . . . Even if the differ-
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The fact patterns of these three cases reflect situations in which the
speech at issue was subject to complete suppression, rather than mere
regulation or limitation. From the perspective of this note, however,
commercial speech would not be completely suppressed by telephone
solicitation regulation; only the method of telephone communication
would be limited. If other areas of protected speech are subject to time,
place and manner restrictions, there is no reason why commercial tele-
phone solicitations should not be subjected to similar restrictions. The
Court in Bates made clear that
[i]n holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to
blanket suppression, and that the advertisement at issue is pro-
tected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys
may not be regulated in any way ....
As with other varieties of speech, it follows as well that there
may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
advertising.54
While commercial speech may thus be afforded First Amendment pro-
tection, it is still subject to traditional limitations.
It is thus clear that all speech, including commercial speech, is
subject to time, place and manner restrictions, so long as these restric-
tions are applied in a constitutionally prescribed manner. The follow-
ing analysis of Supreme Court cases dealing with the area of residential
privacy will provide the basis for applying such restrictions specifically
to telephone solicitations in the home.
II. Towards a Doctrine of Residential Privacy
One commentator has noted that "[p]rivacy is unique in that it
derives little independent protection by precedent and none from the
text of the Constitution while, paradoxically, it is recognized as a fun-
damental social value."55 It is not surprising, therefore, that two dis-
tinct bodies of privacy law have developed 56-- one in tort to remedy a
breach of the social order, and the other as a result of constitutional
ences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to
complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protec-
tion is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired." Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976).
54. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
55. Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 211, 223-24 (1977)
(footnote omitted).
56. There are "two dichotomous concepts of privacy, one tort or 'private law' theory
and the other constitutional or 'public law' in nature. Difficulties arise when determining
which theory, if either, is applicable in a given circumstance. More often there are congeries
of interest, some interrelated, some unrelated, and some clearly inconsistent." Comment,




construction not necessary in an earlier day. 7
The theoretical basis for a right to privacy in tort was provided by
an influential law review article58 written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis. 9 The authors there attempted to prove that the exploitation
of private facts afforded a basis for recovery in tort. Following the
Warren and Brandeis article, several courts adopted their analysis and
applied it in tort cases, 60 and the results were exhaustively analyzed by
Dean Prosser seventy years after the article appeared.6 ' He described
four areas where invasion of privacy justify the award of damages: in-
trusion upon solitude,62 publication of private facts, 63 placing one in a
false light64 and appropriation of one's name or likeness.65 In broad
terms, the last three areas denote specific rights to be free from public
scrutiny-a right not to be spoken about. Only the first, intrusion upon
57. "[Tlhe fourth amendment was drafted to cover the technological realities of 18th
century America. In 1787, the eyes and ears were the only instruments for surveillance; by
keeping officials bodily out of certain places like the home and office, privacy could be as-
sured." Bazelon, supra note 14 at 605 (footnote omitted).
58. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
59. The authors were influenced by the embarrassingly detailed press coverage of the
prominent Warren family's social season. The objections to the reporters' behavior were
apparently limited to the publication itself, rather than the intrusion, since the article does
not describe unwanted intrusions as invasions of the right to privacy. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Warren and Brandeis had harsh words forjouralists: "The
press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but had become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Warren and Brandeis, supra note 58,
at 196.
60. See Prosser, supra note 59, at 384-89 (1960). Two early cases illustrate the ensuing
split in the courts. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902), a photograph of a young woman was used without her permission to advertise flour.
In a four to three decision, the court rejected the Warren-Brandeis theory and declared that
the right to privacy did not exist. Three years later, in a case where an insurance company
had used a man's name and photograph with a fictitious testimonial in its advertising, a
court permitted a cause of action for invasion of privacy and granted relief in the form of
damages. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 867 (1939) recognized a right to privacy, and
the vast majority of states elected to follow this view: "A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
It has been noted that "[t]he major contribution of Warren and Brandeis was in show-
ing through rigorous critical analysis that doctrines of trespass, nuisance, and property were
inadequate for the occasion, and that a new concept of protectible privacy could and should
be evolved, both as a basis for an intelligible rationale for the handful of existing cases and
for future development." Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra." Constitutional Charterfor an Ex-
panded Law ofPrivacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (1965).
61. Prosser, supra note 59, at 383.
62. Id. at 389-92.
63. Id. at 392-98.
64. Id. at 398-401.
65. Id. at 401-07.
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solitude, suggests a right not to be spoken to.66 Intrusion upon solitude
is the only cause of action in tort with a potential for prohibiting some
forms of telephone solicitation.67
While Warren and Brandeis firmly established a basis for tort re-
covery for invasions of privacy, the Supreme Court's decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut68 first established a constitutional right of privacy.
The Griswold Court was confronted with an 1897 Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 69 A Planned Parenthood execu-
tive director and its chief medical officer had provided contraceptive
materials to a married couple. They were fined as accessories under the
aiding and abetting statute. The appellants claimed that a law which
made it a crime to use contraceptives violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas, writing the majority
66. For a thorough discussion of the right not to be spoken to, see Haiman, Speech .
Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REX. 153 (1972).
67. According to Prosser, "the gist of the wrong is clearly the intentional infliction of
mental distress." Prosser, supra note 59, at 422 n.24. However, the degree of harm may be
less than that required for recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress. If the offen-
sive conduct occurs because of an intrusion, the required seriousness of the harm is lessened:
"Where such mental disturbance stands on its own feet, the courts have insisted upon ex-
treme outrage, rejecting all liability for trivialities, and upon genuine and serious mental
harm, attested by physical illness, or by the circumstances of the case. But once 'privacy'
gets into the picture, and the fact of intrusion is added, such guarantees apparently are no
longer required." Id. at 422.
At present, only telephone calls of a quantity and quality sufficient to be considered
harassment have supported recovery in tort. See Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d
340 (1956) (tort recovery allowed when creditor made numerous and frequent threatening
calls to plaintiff and her employer). See generally Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 142
Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274 (1960); Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d
878 (1969); Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d
896 (1947).
The courts have treated intrusions by telephone as less than offensive or objectionable
to a reasonable person unless the harm suffered was serious enough to warrant a claim for
mental distress. Given the reactions of the public, however, it is conceivable that any calls
by an ADRMP could reasonably be considered offensive or objectionable, and the degree of
harm necessary may be correspondingly lessened for an actionable claim. The actual harm
may not suffice for a claim of intentional infliction of mental distress, but based on the
element of intrusion upon solitude, the courts may accept proof of harm considerably less
than that required for mental distress. This approach demonstrates the possibility that the
problem of solicitation by ADRMPs can be addressed through existing tort law, but it does
not affect other, more traditional methods of telephone solicitation. Apart from this ration-
ale, tort law does not provide a basis for dealing with the problem of telephone solicitation.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. Because of the political climate within Connecticut, it appeared that the only hope
for eliminating the law was through Supreme Court action. The source of a constitutional
right of privacy generated substantial debate within the Court, since there were four opin-
ions comprising a seven-justice majority. Concurring opinions found a right of privacy in
the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring), the Fourteenth Amendment,
id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring), and based on a general interpretation of liberty rather
than a specific right, id at 502 (White, J., concurring).
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opinion which recognized a right of privacy, stated that "specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . . Var-
ious guarantees create zones of privacy."7 Having recognized a right
of privacy, the majority opinion concluded that the governmental inter-
est in controlling the use of contraceptives invaded the area of constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms.
This "bold innovation 7' established the constitutional right of
privacy, however ill-defined. A "zone of privacy ' 72 was found implicit
in almost every amendment,73 but like a penumbra, it was not a tangi-
ble body with clearly discernible limits. Without more definition,
"[t]he inescapable implication is that a right without description is a
right without protection. '74 Griswold thus failed to establish a compre-
hensive right of privacy but it did serve to place the concept of privacy
within the constitutional framework.
Under current law, no well-defined sanctuary exists for the indi-
vidual wherever the right of privacy is afforded complete protection.
As the following cases illustrate, the constitutional zone of privacy has
been extended to include protection against intrusions via the door and
the mailbox. While no cases have focused on the extent of protection
against intrusions by the telephone, the door and mailbox, cases cer-
tainly provide a basis for analogous restrictions on home telephone so-
licitation. As will be seen, a balancing test is involved: if the "right of
every person 'to be let alone' must be placed on the scales with the right
of others to communicate, '75 the right of every telephone subscriber
similarly must be weighed against the right of every solicitor to com-
municate.
70. 381 U.S. at 484.
71. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965).
72. 381 U.S. at 484.
73. "The right of association contained in the penumbra of the first amendment is [a
zone of privacy], as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'
"The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life.' We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, to the
Fourth Amendment as creating a 'right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people.'" Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted).
74. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy. Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1976).
75. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1969).
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A. Protecting A Captive Audience
A first and obvious step toward protecting residential privacy
would be to limit auditory intrusions from sources outside the home.
The propriety of such a limitation has been recognized by the Supreme
Court. In Kovacs v. Cooper,7 6 the operator of a sound truck was con-
victed of violating a city ordinance which prohibited the use of any
instrument which emitted "loud and raucous noises"'77 while attached
to any vehicle. His conviction was affirmed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court,7" and by an equally divided court in the New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals.79 The Supreme Court upheld the ordi-
nance. Without relying upon a theory of residential privacy under the
Constitution, the Court nevertheless acknowledged a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in prohibiting "acts or things reasonably thought to
bring evil or harm to its people,' '" and in "protect[ing] the well being
and tranquility of a community." 81 Noting that the unwilling listener
"[i]n his home or on the street. . . is. . . practically helpless to escape
the interference with his privacy by loudspeakers except through the
protection of the municipality,"8" the Court concluded that the "need
for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses. . . justifies
the ordinance."8 3 The ordinance was thus treated as a regulation of the
manner in which a message is communicated to its audience, rather
than as a regulation of the message content itself.
Four years later, in PUC v. Pollak,4 one member of the Court
went so far as to describe unwilling listeners as a "captive audience."
8 5
In that case, two passengers of a District of Columbia transit company
under exclusive congressional franchise brought suit against the public
utilities commission, 6 complaining that radio broadcasts in the buses
abridged their right of privacy. Their complaint was dismissed by the
public utilities commission, and they appealed to the federal district
court, where it was again dismissed. On further appeal, the court of
appeals held that the broadcast of commercials and announcements de-
prived passengers of liberty without due process of law. 7 Reversing
76. 336 U.S. 77 (1948).
77. Id. at 78.
78. 135 N.J.L. 64, 50 A.2d 451 (1946).
79. 135 N.J.L. 584, 52 A.2d 806 (1947).
80. 336 U.S. at 83.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 86-87.
83. Id. at 89.
84. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
85. "The streetcar audience is a captive audience." Id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. PUC v. Pollak, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 94, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
87. Id. at 102, 191 F.2d at 458. The court's analysis focused on the captive audience
argument, which it also referred to as "forced listening." Id. at 99, 191 F.2d at 455.
[Vol. 7:129
TELEPHONE SOLICITATION
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the broadcasts did
not invade the privacy of a passenger on a bus: "However complete his
right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights
of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in
a public conveyance." 88 The majority opinion, written by Justice Bur-
ton, observed that an affirmance of the court of appeals decision would
secure to the passenger "a right of privacy substantially equal to the
privacy to which he is entitled in his own home."89 The home, was
cited by the dissent as the paramount example of protected privacy,
implying that a resident could prohibit any unwanted message from
entering his own home.9°
The ordinance which was ultimately upheld in Kovacs9 1 had pro-
hibited all aural intrusions upon unwilling listeners, primarily resi-
dents. In reaching this result the Court found it unnecessary to
recognize the home as a special zone of privacy. Yet in Pollak, the
Court dealt with an issue unrelated to the home-radio broadcasts on
transit buses-but used the standards applicable to residential privacy
as the yardstick by which to measure other zones requiring protec-
tion.92 The Court in Pollak thus suggested that the home is a zone of
privacy requiring protection, but was unwilling to define the limits of
that protection.
In Cohen v. Calfornia,93 the Supreme Court later clarified the in-
terests involved in restricting speech. There, a war protester was ar-
rested for wearing a jacket with the phrase "Fuck the Draft" printed on
its back as he entered a local courthouse. The Court reversed his con-
viction on several grounds,94 one of which focused on the captive audi-
ence issue. It identified two prerequisites to a valid restriction of speech
where the listener is a captive audience: first, there must be "substan-
tial privacy interests" 95 at stake; and second, this privacy interest must
have been invaded in "an essentially intolerable manner." 96 The Court
observed that while one may have a greater privacy interest in the
courthouse than in, for example, Central Park, such an interest could
not compare to "the interest in being free from unwanted expression in
88. 343 U.S. at 464.
89. Id.
90. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, characterized the resident and the passenger alike as
a "captive audience ... [that] is there as a matter of necessity not of choice." Id. at 468.
91. Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948).
92. Id. at 464-65. See also 1d. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting): "[A] man's home is his
castle beyond invasion either by inquisitive or by officious people. A man loses that privacy
of course when he goes upon the streets or enters public places."
93. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
94. Id. at 19-20. The Court characterized the activity at issue as the "fact of communi-
cation," rather than obscenity or fighting words. Id.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id.
Fall 1979]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the confines of one's home."9 7 Moreover, the audience in the court-
house could have avoided "further bombardment of their sensibilities
simply by averting their eyes."98
Applying the Cohen analysis to the validity of telephone solicita-
tion regulation, it appears that certain restrictions could withstand scru-
tiny. The first requirement, that the regulation protect substantial
privacy interests, is supported by the opinions in Kovacs and Pollak,
where the Court emphasized the value of tranquility in the home, and
the necessity of governmental action to protect it. The second require-
ment is that the prohibited manner of intrusion be "essentially intolera-
ble." In Cohen, the Court stressed the face that Cohen's protest did not
involve "raucous omissions of sound trucks," nor was the audience
powerless to avoid his message. In contrast, both Kovacs and Pollak
involved situations in which the individual was not capable of avoiding
the message. The residential listener's inability to avoid receiving the
message is thus critical to a determination that the intrusion is "intoler-
able" and subject to regulation under Cohen.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Kovacs, Pollak and Cohen ap-
proached the problem of intrusion in terms of a captive audience, the
resident being only an illustrative example. Cases involving door-to-
door solicitation, however, come closer to applying discernible privacy
interests to solicitation in the home.
B. Protecting the Door
Where door-to-door solicitation is at issue, the content of the
message is the critical factor in examining the constitutionality of regu-
lations, rather than their characterization as time, place and manner
restrictions. PUC v. Pollak99 seems to suggest that the home is entitled
to constitutional protection guaranteeing complete privacy,'0° but the
Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Struthers, ' dealing with door-
to-door solicitation, significantly narrows this conclusion.
In Struthers, a door-to-door solicitor of handbills for a free reli-
gious meeting was arrested for violating a city ordinance banning door-
to-door distribution of handbills and circulars. The Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed her appeal, 0 2 but the Supreme Court invalidated the
ordinance as a violation of both the solicitor's right to address a willing
listener, 0 3 and the resident's right to receive a welcome message)°4
97. Id. at 21-22.
98. Id. at 21.
99. 343 U.S. 451.
100. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
101. 319 U.S. 141 (1942).
102. 139 Ohio St. 372, 40 N.E.2d 154 (1942).
103. In Struthers, the Court recognized the need for a balance between the rights of the
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The Court held that only the householder, as opposed to the commu-
nity at large, had the right to determine whether or not he would re-
ceive noncommercial solicitors: "Whether such visiting shall be
permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the
individual master of each household, and not upon the determination
of the community.""'5 Since a resident could provide or withhold con-
sent by posting a sign or notice,10 6 it was deemed unnecessary for the
municipality to restrict such solicitation. The opinion left open, how-
ever, the question of the existence of similar protection for commercial
solicitations made door-to-door.10 7
In contrast to Struthers, where the Court focused on the rights of
both solicitors and householders, the Court in Breard v. Alexandria1
0 8
focused almost exclusively on the rights of the former group. There, a
door-to-door solicitor of magazines was arrested for violating what is
commonly referred to as a Green River'09 ordinance, which prohibited
all door-to-door commercial solicitation. Earlier, in Struthers, the
Court had noted that the homeowner could best protect his privacy by
posting signs, so that the prohibitory ordinance in that case was im-
practical and unnecessary and therefore an inappropriate restriction on
freedom of speech. The Court in Breard catalogued the frequency and
seriousness of abuse by door-to-door solicitors and noted that the post-
ing of signs by individual residents, while still possible, was now im-
practical.11 It then proceeded to uphold the ordinance as a valid
limitation on the solicitor's rights, rather than focusing on the privacy
speaker and the audience: "In any case, the problem must be worked out by each commu-
nity for itself with due respect for the constitutional rights of those desiring to distribute
literature and those who choose to exclude such distributors from the home . . . .The
Struthers ordinance does not safeguard these constitutional rights." 319 U.S. at 148-49.
104. Id. The individual's right to receive information has been frequently emphasized
by the Court. See notes 43-53 and accompanying text supra. See also Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (birth control information); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(political literature) (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 141.
106. Id. at 147.
107. The decision applied to "[f]reedom to distribute information." Id. at 146-47.
108. 341 U.S. 622 (1950).
109. Green River ordinances are named after Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,
65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933), a decision upholding an ordinance banning commercial door-
to-door solicitation.
110. The majority opinion emphasized that the impracticality was a function of the in-
crease in the number of solicitations: "Door-to-door canvassing has flourished increasingly
in recent years with the ready market furnished by the rapid concentration of housing. The
infrequent and still welcome solicitor to the rural home became to some a recurring nuisance
in towns when the visits were multiplied. Unwanted knocks on the door by day or night are
a nuisance, or worse, to peace and quiet. The local retail merchant, too, has not been un-
mindful of the effective competition furnished by house-to-house selling in many lines. ...
The idea of barring classified salesmen from homes by means of notices posted by individ-
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rights of householders."'
The Court's decision in Breard is important for two reasons. First,
the ordinance was analyzed as a regulation of the manner of communi-
cation, rather than as a complete prohibition as in Struthers, even
though the ordinances in both cases had the practical effect of prohibit-
ing all solicitation. The Court in Breard stated: "Subscriptions may be
made. . . without the annoyances of house-to-house canvassing. We
think those communities that have found these methods of sale obnox-
ious may control them by ordinance.""' 2 In response to the argument
that such ordinances violate the right of free speech, the Court charac-
terized it as "a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free
press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit solicitors
of publications to the home premises of its residents. We see no
abridgement of the principles of the first amendment in this ordi-
nance."1
13
Breard is also important for a second, less obvious reason. It illus-
trates that the validity of time, place and manner restrictions may de-
pend upon the circumstances under which they are imposed. What
may be unreasonably restrictive in one setting might be a reasonable
regulation in another. Earlier, in Struthers, the Court held that door-
to-door solicitation could be controlled by action of the individual
householder,' 14 but seven years later, the Breard opinion cited the
abuse and concurrent social change which supported the need for the
legislative action at issue. The Breard Court emphasized the necessity
of balancing the First Amendment rights of the solicitors against the
governmental interest in protecting the privacy interests of its citizens;
striking such a balance necessitated "an adjustment of constitutional
rights in the light of the particular living conditions of the time and
place." I'
The sole distinction between Struthers and Breard appears to be
the characterization of the content of the intended message. Struthers
based its protection of solicitors on the noncommercial nature of the
solicitation, the dissemination of information about a religious meeting.
ual householders was rejected early as less practical than an ordinance regulating solicitors."
343 U.S. at 626-27 (footnotes omitted).
111. In recognizing the constitutional right of privacy, the Griswold majority cited
Breard as an example of a legitimate privacy interest. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965).
112. 341 U.S. at 644-45.
113. Id. at 645.
114. "For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for persons
not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors.. . to communicate
ideas. ... Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to depend
upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of
the community." 319 U.S. at 141.
115. 341 U.S. at 626.
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Breard based its limitation on solicitors on the commercial nature of
the solicitation, the canvassing for magazine subscriptions. If solicitors
can be called "the press or oral advocates of ideas,"I 6 then their speech
cannot be prohibited without abridging their First Amendment rights.
According to Struthers, householders must be free to receive noncom-
mercial solicitations. But after Breard, such protection is "not open to
the solicitors for gadgets or brushes."" 7 The two cases, when read to-
gether, suggest that where the intrusion is made by door-to-door solici-
tation, noncommercial speech is protected to the extent that the
householder wishes to receive it, while commercial speech may be ef-
fectively prohibited by regulation," 8 whether the householder wishes
to receive it or not.
Struthers and Breard may be seen as decisions strictly limited to
the problem of door-to-door solicitation. Combined with Kovacs and
Pollak, they demonstrate the Court's increasing concern with external
intrusions upon the home. Without more, telephone solitication could
be interpreted as lying outside the scope of the Court's concern, be-
cause the intrusion is an inherent problem of telephone subscription.
In its approach to solicitation by mail, however, the Court has indi-
cated a broader concern for residential privacy.
C. Protecting the Mailbox
The mailbox is the third avenue by which a potentially unwanted
message can be brought into the home. Unlike the first two areas of
analysis, this problem has been addressed by federal statute. Title III
of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967' ' was enacted to
protect the addressee's right not to receive certain messages. Under the
Act, if an addressee has received advertisements for matter which he in
his "sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually pro-
vocative,"' 2 ° the addressee can request the postmaster to issue an order
that his name be removed from a sender's mailing list and thereby pro-
hibit future mailings from that sender. The constitutionality of this
statute was upheld soon after its enactment.
In Rowan v. Post Office Department, '2 a declaratory ruling was
sought by publishers, distributors, mailing list brokers, and owners and
116. Id. at 641.
117. Id.
118. Examples of decisions which have upheld restrictions or prohibitions of door-to-
door solicitations include: People v. Mobin, 237 Cal. App. 2d 115, 46 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965);
City of Clifton v. Weber, 84 N.J. Super. 333, 202 A.2d 186 (App. Div. 1964), affid, 44 N.J.
Super. 266, 208 A.2d 401 (1965); Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113,
205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
119. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a)(Supp. IV 1964).
120. Id.
121. 397 U.S. 728 (1969).
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operators of mailing services and mail order houses that the statute vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendment rights to free speech and due
process. They claimed that while the goal of the statute to curb objec-
tionable sexually-oriented material was legitimate, it had been improp-
erly interpreted by the Postmaster to include all materials. The United
States District Court for the Central District of California concluded
that the act was constitutional when interpreted to encompass adver-
tisements similar to those initially mailed to the addressee.1
2 2
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "Congress did not
intend so restrictive a scope to those provisions."'' 23 In upholding the
statute, it stated that "[t]he section was intended to allow the addressee
complete and unfettered discretion in electing whether or not he de-
sired to receive further materials from a particular sender. . . .The
interpretation . . . that most completely effectuates that intent is one
that prohibits any further mailings."'2 4 For the first time the Court
specifically recognized that the privacy of the home is part of "the right
of every person 'to be let alone' [which] must be placed in the scales
with the right of others to communicate."'' 2 5 Just as the Court in
Breard noted the growing annoyance of door-to-door solicitation re-
quiring protective legislation, the Court in Rowan recognized the grow-
ing annoyance of junk mail. 26 It viewed the statute as a response to
that problem: "In effect, Congress had erected a wall-or more accu-
rately permits a citizen to erect a wall-that no advertiser may pene-
trate without his acquiescence."'' 2 7  The mails, as a manner of
communication, can therefore be regulated to restrict speech.
Rowan is critical to an analysis of residential privacy because it
sets forth an absolute limit upon the solicitor's right to communicate to
a recipient. This right "is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of
122. 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1040.
123. 397 U.S. at 731.
124. Id. at 734-35.
125. Id. at 736.
126. The Court emphasized the voluminous amount of unsolicited mail received by the
ordinary American household: "In today's complex society we are inescapably captive audi-
ences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to
permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail. To make the householder
the exclusive and final judge of what will cross his threshold undoubtedly has the effect of
impeding the flow of ideas, information, and arguments that, ideally, he should receive and
consider. Today's merchandising methods, the plethora of mass mailings subsidized by low
postal rates, and the growth of the sale of large mailing lists as an industry in itself have
changed the mailman from a carrier of primarily private communications, as he was in a
more leisurely day, and have made him an adjunct of the mass mailer who sends unsolicited
and often unwanted mail into every home. It places no strain on the doctrine of judicial
notice to observe that whether measured by pieces or pounds, Everyman's mail today is
made up overwhelmingly of material he did not seek from persons he does not know. And
all too often it is matter he finds offensive." Id. at 736.
127. Id. at 738.
[Vol. 7:129
TELEPHONE SOLICITATION
the addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from that
mailer." 28 Rowan thus permits complete restriction of any unwanted
intrusion into the mailbox upon the sole discretion and initiative of the
addressee, regardless of the content of the solicitation.
In the foregoing residential privacy cases, the Court dealt with reg-
ulations which limit the accessibility of an audience to the speaker, as
distinguished from total prohibition. In each case, the Court balanced
the First Amendment rights of the speaker against the privacy interests
of the resident. In Struthers, the privacy interests of some residents
were deemed secondary to the right of other residents to receive non-
commercial messages; the speaker could not be prohibited from ad-
dressing a willing audience. Breard held that the privacy interests of
the resident outweighed the First Amendment rights of the speaker
with a commercial message. In Rowan, the Court summarized the bal-
ancing of interests:
Weighing. the highly important right to communicate, but with-
out trying to determine where it fits into constitutional impera-
tives, against the very basic right to be free from sights, sounds,
and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a mailer's
right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee. 1
29
The right of privacy of the resident in the home is thus greater than the
First Amendment right of a speaker who delivers an unwanted message
by visual, auditory or tangible means.
Once this interest in residential privacy is established, it is possible
to apply standards for restricting speech which is the source of the in-
trusion. In each of the areas of communications explored above, the
governmental interest involved was the protection of a captive audi-
ence-the listener who is unable to escape a given message. Applying
the Cohen test discussed above, 130 it must be shown that "substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable man-
ner"'' before government may restrict speech. Kovacs, Pollak and
Breard recognized the resident as an audience with substantial privacy
interests. Kovacs and Pollak demonstrated that the inability to avoid a
message renders the intrusion "intolerable." Moreover, Rowan itself
has been cited for the proposition that "in the privacy of the home,...
the individual's right to be let alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder."'
' 32
128. Id. at 737.
129. Id. at 736-37.
130. See notes 93-98 and accompanying text supra.
131. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
132. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (affirming action taken by the Federal
Communications Commission against a local radio broadcaster upon complaint by a listener
that objectionable material had been broadcast). In Pae4fca, the Court recognized the elec-
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D. The Telephone Analogy
Telephone solicitation may have seemed, until very recently, a
trivial problem which each subscriber could handle in his own way.
But technological advances, including ADRMPs, WATS lines and
computer data files,13 3 suggest a change in the industry which justifies
legislative action.
By analogy to door-to-door solicitation and solicitation by mail,
several observations can be made about the nature of solicitation by
telephone. Most importantly, the telephone is in general a more active
method of communication than either mail or door-to-door solicitation.
All door-to-door solicitation and delivery of objectionable mail can be
prohibited by order of the householder. The resident can determine
whether or not he desires to admit a door-to-door solicitor without
opening the door. In contrast, a telephone subscriber must answer the
phone to determine whether or not he wishes to receive the message.
Similarly, unsolicited mail is picked up at one's convenience. Once
picked up, it is often easily distinguished from personal correspondence
and can be discarded without reading the contents. By its ring, how-
ever, the telephone gives no indication of the nature or source of the
call and requires answering if only to restore peace to the home.
Each of the cases discussed above, with the exception of Struthers,
recognized that the individual by himself is incapable of protecting his
privacy. In Struthers, the Court felt that the individual was in fact ca-
pable of enforcing his wishes and could avoid an unwanted message;
thus the ordinance was ruled invalid. Kovacs, Breard and Pollak, on
the other hand, all involved situations in which the individual was not
capable of avoiding the message; legislative efforts to protect the lis-
tener were therefore upheld.
In pinpointing the precise balance between rights of privacy and
speech, the main objective is to protect the individual resident in situa-
tions where he is incapable of protecting himself. The First Amend-
ment rights of the speaker in those situations are outweighed by the
privacy interests of the listener. The speech may be relegated to an-
other medium, or to another forum, where the individual may exercise
discretion. Thus, by use of time, place and manner restrictions, unso-
licited speech may be effectively excluded from the home. The only
qualification remaining is that found in Struthers: the resident must be
free to receive noncommercial solicitations if he so desires.
Regulations that result in prohibiting telephone solicitations to the
home are of two basic types: those that allow the resident to indicate
tronic media as "a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans." Id. Offensive
material broadcast to listeners in public and in private constitutes a harm of an intrusive
nature that the FCC has an obligation to proscribe.
133. See notes 4-16 and accompanying text supra.
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his unwillingness to receive calls and those that prohibit only commer-
cial calls. By allowing the individual to decide whether he will receive
solicitations, the requirements meet the test of Struthers. By contrast,
legislation that prohibits only commercial solicitations in an effort to
satisfy the requirements of Struthers, by allowing noncommercial calls
to be made unrestricted, still faces serious challenge on First Amend-
ment grounds. A brief examination of the content-neutrality doctrine,
as it applies to a prohibition of commercial speech on the basis of con-
tent, will illustrate that legislation of this type will not survive constitu-
tional challenge.
E. Content-Neutrality versus the Right of Privacy
Both commercial and noncommercial speech are protected by the
First Amendment, and both are subject to time, place and manner reg-
ulation, as has been shown above. What remains to be determined is
whether regulations may distinguish the two types of speech, restricting
only commercial speech. The issue is particularly pressing because the
trend of the Supreme Court, as has been described above, is to afford
commercial speech the fullest protection of the First Amendment. The
rule that time, place and manner regulation of protected speech must
be content-neutral was expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Police Department v. Mosley.'34 A single picket daily
walked the sidewalk adjacent to a Chicago school, his signs accusing
the school of racial discrimination. The day before a city ordinance
that allowed picketing only in the event of a labor dispute went into
effect, he ceased picketing and brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief. The District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, invali-
dating the ordinance.'35
The Supreme Court affirmed,' 36 ruling that "the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' 37 The majority
stated that the only acceptable qualification of this rule would be "to
protect public order. But these justifications for selective exclusions
from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized."' 138 Mosley there-
fore embodies the rule that content-based regulations face a conclusive
presumption of invalidity, save perhaps for situations bearing on "the
public order." In these situations the regulation is still presumptively
invalid and is subject to strict scrutiny.
134. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
135. Mosley v. Police Dep't of Chicago, 432 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1970).
136. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
137. Id. at 95.
138. Id. at 98-99.
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In two more recent cases the issue of content-neutrality arose in
the context of movie theaters which screened sexually oriented but non-
obscene "adult" films. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville'39 the Court
held, inter alia, that the showing of the films at a drive-in theater adja-
cent to a residential neighborhood could not be regulated because the
films were not obscene, and were thus protected by the First Amend-
ment. The Court stated that such a regulation "must satisfy the rigor-
ous constitutional standards that apply when government attempts to
regulate expression."' 4 ° The heavy burden of the strict presumption in
Mosley was thus affirmed in Erznoznik, although the language of the
opinion suggests that that presumption is less than conclusive. 4 '
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 142 posed a different prob-
lem concerning movie theaters. In an effort to disperse adult theaters,
Detroit adopted an ordinance which specifically defined sexually
oriented films and required that theaters screening such films be li-
censed and not operate within 1000 feet of each other or of other simi-
lar "adult" establishments. Operators of two theaters challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance in an action for injunctive relief.'43
The trial court, however, upheld the ordinance as a rational attempt to
preserve the city's neighborhoods.'" The court of appeals reversed, 1
45
observing that although the city's interest in protecting neighborhoods
from crime incident to "adult" businesses was legitimate, the city had
failed to provide evidence to prove that the regulation was necessary in
achieving its goal.'
46
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance. " In a plurality opin-
ion four justices 48 held that, notwithstanding the nonobscene and
therefore protected character of the film, the regulation of the movie
theaters on the basis of film content was valid to achieve the city's goal
of preserving neighborhoods and the quality of life for residents. The
opinion declined to disturb the "wisdom"' 4 1 of the city in framing a
regulation that would achieve its objective. Thus the plurality appar-
139. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
140. Id. at 217.
141. Id.
142. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
143. Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
144. Id.
145. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
146. 'The City did not discharge its heavy burden of justifying the prior restraint which
these ordinances undoubtedly impose by merely establishing that they were designed to
serve a compelling public interest. Since fundamental rights are involved, the City had the
further burden of showing that the method which it chose to deal with the problem at hand
was necessary and that its effect on protected rights was only incidental." Id. at 1019-20.
147. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
148. Burger, C.J., White, Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.
149. 427 U.S. at 71.
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ently abandoned the strict Mosley presumption and used a balancing
approach in its stead. The governmental interest in protecting neigh-
borhoods from decline and crime outweighed the citizen's interest in
screening adult films with a particular content.
1 50
Justice Powell joined with the plurality in the result, but his con-
currence did not accept their new approach. Rather, he relied on a
zoning theory, declaring that First Amendment rights were affected
"only incidentally and to a limited extent." 5 ' In his opinion Powell
dismissed the classification of adult films as unnecessary in reaching
the result.
Because of the inherent weaknesses in the plurality opinion in
Young, the present application of the content-neutrality doctrine is un-
certain. In the context of legislation which distinguishes between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech for the purpose of restricting
telephone solicitations, for example, the strict Mosley rule may still ap-
ply, invalidating the legislation. The Erznoznik qualification would not
save such legislation since "the public order" is not at issue. If the
Young approach were utilized, the Court would balance the right to
residential privacy against the right to make a particular type of tele-
phone solicitation. In light of the protection of residential privacy as a
fundamental right, such legislation would be in conflict with the state
goal. The state interest in protecting privacy is compelling, but the dis-
tinction between protected noncommercial and commercial telephone
calls does not facilitate achieving that objective. If the governmental
purpose in regulating telephone solicitation is to protect privacy, there
is no logical or rational reason to suggest that limiting only commercial
calls will achieve that goal to any greater degree than limiting all calls.
If a call is intrusive, it is no less intrusive if it is noncommercial than if
it is commercial. Legislation which distinguishes the two types of
speech in the context of telephone solicitation is therefore extremely
vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the content-neutrality doc-
trine.
Each of the residential privacy cases discussed limits the solicitor's
contact with the home-from sound-truck broadcasts to door-to-door
solicitors to the mails. The discernible trend is to extend protection to
the home from unwanted solicitations of all types. But the privacy of
the home is not fully protected until all solicitation-including that by
telephone-can be prohibited by the householder. Several methods of
limiting telephone solicitation have been developed. The next section
of this note will examine these plans and a legislative model which
150. "[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's
right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id. at 70.
151. Id. at 73.
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would permit prohibition of telephone solicitation by the subscriber
will be proposed.
III. The Legislative Model
The doctrine of residential privacy, as shown by the foregoing dis-
cussion, provides a persuasive rationale for legislative action to restrict
telephone solicitation. Each of the four methods of intrusion into the
home has been the result of technological change. 52 This trend was
noted by one commentator who observed that "concomitantly with in-
creasing legal recognition of privacy, there has developed a technico-
logical ability to invade it by a number of means heretofore not
known."' 53 By the very nature of the judicial system, 54 the means to
invade privacy are developed and put into use long before the courts
are afforded the opportunity to consider their constitutional implica-
tions and establish guidelines to protect individual rights.
Legislative bodies, on the other hand, can anticipate and respond
to changing social needs. They are able to investigate problems, pre-
dict areas of potential conflict, and act to prevent the compromise of
freedoms and rights.-55 Legislatures can also anticipate likely areas of
disagreement, giving the courts language reflecting their intentions as
to further interpretation. 56  Since the telephone solicitation industry
has been quick to make use of technological and commercial advances,
legislative action is the best approach for solving the proliferating
problems. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases dealing with residential
152. Indeed, the very basis for the Warren-Brandeis article was the muckraking journal-
ism then in vogue. To introduce their analysis of the right to privacy, they noted that
"[r]ecent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual. . . the right 'to be
let alone."' Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 195. See also note 59 supra.
153. Miller, Do Americans Value Privacy?, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 41 (G. McClellan
ed. 1976). Regulation of telephone solicitation is not new. At least one community, Tampa,
Florida, passed an anti-solicitation ordinance in September, 1964. It was repealed in Octo-
ber, 1964. But the development of ADRMPs, which were first marketed during the summer
of 1977, has created a storm of protest resulting in numerous attempts to enact restrictive
measures. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
154. The jurisdiction of the judiciary extends only to review of actions of the legislative
and executive branches and decisions of lower courts. It is beyond the scope of the judiciary
to act sui generis or to undertake to establish policies or procedures.
155. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). The act established limitations on the permissible use
by the federal government of individually-identifiable information.
156. See, e.g., notes 123-27 and accompanying text supra. In Rowan v. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1969), the Court analyzed at length the legislative history of Title III of the
Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967. The Act was claimed to apply only to
sexually oriented material, but the Court concluded from the language of the Act, together
with records of the legislative hearings, that the underlying legislative intent required a
broader interpretation. The Act was construed in Rowan to apply to all objectionable mate-
rial.
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privacy provide adequate guidelines for appropriate legislation. The
first issue to be addressed is a determination of the scope of prospective
restrictions.
A. Restricting Telephone Solicitation
It can be argued that the regulation of residential telephone solici-
tation, regardless of the commercial or noncommercial nature of the
intended message, is constitutionally valid. The proposed model dis-
cussed below reflects this perspective.
The five aforementioned congressional bills 15 7 and apparently all
of the state proposals, 58 except those which purport to ban ADRMP
use rather than telephone solicitationper se, are narrower in scope and
refer only to limitations on commercial solicitation.159 One reason for
157. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Those bills include the following: H.R. 9506,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); H.R. 10033, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 12,282
(1978); H.R. 10032, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 12,282 (1978); H.R. 9506, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9505, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
158. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
159. The following discussion of legislative proposals is based on a survey made in 1978.
While it is not an exhaustive list, it does indicate the typical forms that such legislation has
taken and the general number of states considering actions to limit telephone solicitation. It
should be noted that many states have several bills embodying the same approach and some
bills contain more than one approach. The bills, which differ in numerous ways, have been
categorized for purposes of this discussion.
The asterisk approach was proposed in two states, Indiana, H.B. 1045 (1978), and Wis-
consin, A.B. 857 (1978), S.B. 436 (1978). Neither state enacted the bills into law. The ration-
ale of this approach and its disadvantages are discussed in the text accompanying notes 167-
70 infra.
The congressional approach has been enacted in Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.472
(1978), and proposed in additional states-Arizona, H.B. 2162, 33d Leg., 2d Sess. (1978);
Florida, H.B. 1029 (1978), S.B. 205 (1978); Hawaii, H.B. 2823, 9th Leg. (1978); Illinois, H.B.
2637 (1978); Iowa, H.F. 428, 67th Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.; Missouri, H.B. 1578, 79th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978); New Jersey, A.B. 1308 (1978); New York, A.B. 9096 (1978);
Rhode Island, H.B. 7613, Jan. Sess. (1978); Virginia, H.B. 1136 (1978) and Wisconsin, A.B.
857 (1978), S.B. 436 (1978). The disadvantages of this approach are discussed in the text
accompanying note 177 infra.
The only state to propose a complete ban on telephone solicitation has been Iowa. S.F.
2099, 67th Gen. Assembly, 1978 Sess. The remaining proposals limit telephone solicitation
to a much lesser extent.
Six states, for example, enacted legislation which would ban calls made by ADRMPs:
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.472 (1978); California, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2821 (West
Supp. 1979); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.165 (West Supp. 1979); Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78, § 55c (Supp. 1979); Texas, PUB. UTIL. COMM'N R. 052.02(h) (1978); and Wis-
consin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.72 (West Supp. 1979-80). Legislation which would ban
ADRMPs has been proposed in nine states: Florida, H.B. 1029 (1978), H.B. 439 (1978);
Hawaii, H.B. 2823, 9th Leg. (1978); Illinois, S.B. 1382, 80th Gen. Assembly (1978); Michi-
gan, H.B. 5944 (1978); Minnesota, H.F. 1747 (1978), S.F. 1620 (1978); New York, A.B. 10536
(1978), A.B. 9096 (1978); Pennsylvania, S.B. 1363 (1978); Rhode Island, H.B. 7613 (1978);
and Tennessee, H.B. 2336 (1978), S.B. 2078 (1978). This approach is effective only insofar as
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this may be that politicians are understandably reluctant to ban politi-
cal and charitable solicitations. There is perhaps no remedy for this
reluctance except for an overwhelming mandate from their constituen-
cies. 160 Another reason for the less comprehensive reach of existing
proposals may stem from the mistaken assumption that the Supreme
Court's recent extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech would preclude all restrictions. But as demonstrated earlier,
this is not a valid concern; 61 both commercial and noncommercial
speech may still be regulated by appropriate time, place and manner
restrictions.
Both commercial and noncommercial telephone solicitation
should be prohibited for three reasons. First, since time, place and
manner restrictions can constitutionally be applied to noncommercial
speech, 162 traditionally an area of greater First Amendment protection,
they can logically be applied to commercial speech as well. Second, the
distinction between a commercial and a noncommercial solicitation is
not always easily drawn. 163 If noncommercial calls are permitted while
commercial calls are not, economic pressure may cause an essentially
it eliminates intrastate use of ADRMPs. The subscriber may not be benefited, since it is
both relatively easy to make calls across state lines and inexpensive due to the availability of
low-cost long-distance telephone services (e.g., WATS lines). The ultimate result may not
even be perceptible to the subscriber. A ban on the use of ADRMPs, furthermore, would
only operate to eliminate one method of delivering telephone solicitations. The privacy of
the subscriber would not be protected from intrusion by unwanted calls.
Three states have proposed legislation which would eliminate ADRMP calls to one
minute. Florida, S.B. 205 (1978); Missouri, H.B. 1578, 79th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978);
and New York, A.B. 9096 (1978). This method has the added disadvantage over the
ADRMP ban of allowing ADRMP calls intrastate. The calls may be shorter in duration but
more in number, since a possible result of the time limitation is to encourage solicitors to
make multiple calls to deliver the same message currently delivered in only one. The sub-
scriber's privacy interest is not served by such an approach.
Maryland, H.B. 537 (1978) and Missouri, H.B. 930, 79th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess.
(1978), S.B. 724, 79th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978), proposed that calls by ADRMPs be
permitted only when the solicitors obtained written consent from the subscriber in advance.
This approach is less effective in eliminating calls than a complete ban on ADRMPs and,
again, will not affect those calls originating outside state boundaries.
160. See, e.g., Tampa, Florida ordinance 3612-A, passed September 22, 1964 and re-
pealed October 20, 1964. There, the community acted-however ambivalently-to elimi-
nate telephone solicitation: "The twenty-eight day life span of one such anti-solicitation
ordinance suggests that adoption of effective measures to protect residential solitude will be
made only through compromise and insistence of an intensely persistent body politic."
Note, I 1 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 109, 119 (1970).
161. See notes 38-54 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 22-27 and accompanying text supra.
163. Consider, for example, the commercial and noncommercial elements in the follow-
ing: telephone campaign by the Boy Scouts to sell magazines; a survey testing brand-name
recognition of pickles; a call by a local automobile salesman soliciting charitable donations
to be delivered to his dealership.
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commercial message to be framed to avoid the prohibition. 64 Third,
and perhaps most importantly, if telephone solicitations are to be re-
stricted because they invade a right of residential privacy, the message
is no less an invasion if it is noncommercial than if it is commercial.
Thus, as has been discussed above, any legislation which undertakes on
its face to classify commercial and noncommercial calls and prohibit
only commercial calls would very likely not survive a challenge on
First Amendment content-neutrality grounds.
At present, a residential telephone subscriber may protect his pri-
vacy from telephone solicitors by either not answering the telephone or
by hanging up on each unwanted caller. Neither is an entirely satisfac-
tory solution. Earlier sections of this note have examined the prece-
dents which provide constitutional guidelines for limiting telephone
solicitation. The following section will explore a variety of proposals
for restricting telephone solicitation consistent with those guidelines.
B. Proposals
The cases dealing with residential privacy provide sufficient guide-
lines for the formulation of constitutionally valid restrictions on tele-
phone solicitation. Struthers, for example, indicated that in order for
such a regulation to be valid, each householder must be capable of re-
ceiving noncommercial information; the posting of a sign is sufficient to
prohibit undesirable solicitation of a noncommercial nature. 65 Rowan
held that regulations permitting addressees to prohibit delivery of mail
from certain senders are permissible methods of protecting privacy. 1
66
The restriction of telephone solicitation, then, requires legislation that
permits the user to demonstrate his desire to remain undisturbed. It
must also include sanctions to enforce the wishes of the subscriber. But
while the principle is clear, the mechanics of such a regulatory scheme
have yet to be established. Various approaches have been suggested by
the proponents of telephone solicitation regulation.
L The Asterisk Approach
In 1965 a telephone subscriber appeared before the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) demanding that an asterisk be
placed before his name in the telephone book to signify his unwilling-
164. Since a completed noncommercial call costs from one to six cents and has 20 times
the effectiveness of mass mailings costing many times more, the economic pressure may
cause solicitors to devise methods to bring calls with a commercial purpose within the letter
of the law permitting non-commercial solicitation. Interim Opinion, supra note 5, at 20.
165. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
166. 397 U.S. at 736.
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ness to receive solicitations.'67 The CPUC also heard testimony oppos-
ing this request. The telephone company estimated an initial cost of
$4.2 million to effect the asterisk program (based on an estimate that
twenty-five percent of its subscribers would wish to participate), with
an annual recurring cost of approximately $2.3 million. 68 The cost
would be passed along to subscribers. The Commission dismissed the
request and held that such regulation was appropriately left to the leg-
islature.
This approach was more recently embodied in Indiana House Bill
1045.169 The bill proposed that the telephone company be allowed to
charge the consumer for the service of inserting the identifying mark in
the telephone book. In addition to the arguments, which were made in
the 1965 California case, 170 that the procedure itself is too expensive for
practical implementations, it can also be argued that this approach ef-
fectively charges the consumer for not receiving calls. The fee, no mat-
ter how small, may discourage those who wish to protect their privacy.
This result makes the asterisk approach undesirable.
2 The Street Address Directory Approach
The CPUC also considered an alternative proposal. ' 7 ' The tele-
phone company publishes quarterly a telephone book wherein sub-
scribers are listed by street address rather than by name. An individual
may have his name removed from the directory at any time free of
charge. The telephone company suggested regulations to require solici-
tors to use the Street Address Directory; individuals wishing to have
their names deleted could do so without additional cost to the con-
sumer public.
This approach remains popular with the telephone company, but
critics have pointed out a major flaw-that these directories are used
for other legitimate purposes. Police representatives indicated at the
hearings that such deletions would limit the effective use of the direc-
tory by fire and police services.172 Also, legitimate neighborhood serv-
167. McDaniel v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 PUB. U. REP. 3d 47 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1965).
168. Id. at 49, 55. These figures apply only to the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph serv-
ice area. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph representatives also indicated that additional
equipment and operators would be needed to supply directory information services related
to the use of the asterisk system, but gave no additional figure for these costs. Id.
169. Indiana H.B. 1045, 1978 Gen. Assembly. Similar bills are Wisc. H.B. 857 and S.B.
436 (1978).
170. See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
171. Id. at 49. McDaniel also requested an order requiring Pacific Telephone and Tele-
graph to secure subscriber permission for publication of names in the street address direc-
tory.
172. The sheriff of Alameda County testified in opposition to the Street Address Direc-
tory proposal. He listed instances when the directory was used by police personnel: location
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ices 173 would be denied access to a perhaps interested and willing
resident whose name was deleted only because he wished to avoid tele-
phone solicitations. The significant governmental interest in maintain-
ing community services might negate any potential benefit gained.
Indeed, these arguments have thus far prevented the adoption of this
approach.
3. The Congressional Approach
The Congressional proposals 74 require the solicitor to pay for a
list of residential subscribers who are unwilling to receive telephone
solicitations. This system would require the telephone company to pro-
vide an alternative listing, giving a subscriber the opportunity to signify
annually his lack of willingness to be solicited by telephone. The solici-
tors would pay for the listing so no additional cost would be borne by
the subscribing public. Solicitors would be required to comply with
this list, and penalties would be assessed where violations occurred. In
effect, as Congressman Aspin said, "subscribers [will have] hung 'No
Solicitors' signs on their phones .... ,,175 As with the others, however,
this proposed restriction on solicitation would apply only to commer-
cial calls. Where subscribers do not express their unwillingness to re-
ceive calls, solicitations made by automatic equipment must be limited
to one minute or less.
This plan has much to recommend it. It provides the necessary
opportunity for subscribers to receive noncommercial solicitations, as
required by Struthers. It also allows the individual resident to indicate,
by his own initiative and discretion, his unwillingness to receive all
messages, as required by Rowan. A major criticism of the congres-
sional plan focuses on the cost to solicitors. Any plan to restrict tele-
phone solicitation will involve significant cost, however, and this plan
requires the solicitors, rather than the consumer, to subsidize the cost of
the solicitations. 176
of a missing child, investigation of crimes, notification of next-of-kin, service of warrants,
communications with patrols in the field, and pinpointing locations of fires. Id. at 58-60.
173. Other legitimate uses of the Street Address Directory were mentioned at the hear-
ings, such as its use by school districts for determining whether students are properly regis-
tered, by county planners for determining property locations in connection with rights-of-
way, and by assessors, tax collectors and other officials. Id. at 58.
174. See note 19 supra.
175. Congressional Record, H.R. 9505-06, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. E6213
(1977) (Introductory remarks by Congressman Les Aspin).
176. It should be noted, however, in the words of Murray Roman, Chairman of the
Campaign Communications Institute of America, that "[i]n one way or another, that cost is
ultimately going to be passed on to the consumer." U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Sept. 11,
1978 at 44.
Proponents of telephone solicitation also contend that the increased cost will result in
lost jobs. Appellants in Breard also presented this argument, claiming "'the right to engage
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There are two major drawbacks to the congressional approach.
The first is the classification of calls into commercial and noncommer-
cial and the subsequent limitation of the ban to commercial calls. Be-
cause the legislation itself classifies calls on the basis of content, it
would be vulnerable to challenge on First Amendment content-neutral-
ity grounds. The author himself has made it clear that the objective of
the bill is to protect the privacy of the subscriber. 77 To distinguish
commercial calls and subject them to prohibition without the same
treatment for noncommercial calls is not necessary to effectuate the
goal and, in fact, works to frustrate it. Such legislation in its present
form, therefore, cannot survive challenge.
The second major drawback is the relatively slight limitation on
the use of ADRMPs, such as automatic calls being limited to less than
one minute. The threat from such calls is only partially that their
length may deprive subscribers without a disconnect feature from using
their telephones during automatic calls. The remaining problems in-
clude sequential dialing machines that call numbers on a given fre-
quency, including unlisted numbers; development of computerized
data files on subscribers to enable solicitors to make effective calls; and
the general proliferation of solicitations delivered to the home.
C. The Proposed Model
Of the three proposals discussed above, the congressional plan ap-
pears to be the most complete. But even that plan would restrict only
commercial solicitations. As the preceding discussion has indicated,'
there is ample support for allowing the restriction of all telephone solic-
itations, both commercial and noncommercial, of those residents who
indicate an unwillingness to receive them. Indeed, the doctrine of con-
tent-neutrality requires such a result. The proposed model which fol-
lows is based upon those considerations.
A BILL
To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit
making unsolicited telephone calls to persons who have indi-
cated they do not wish to receive such calls.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in one of the common occupations of life,'" 341 U.S. 622, 629 (1951) (citations omitted),
which the Court characterized as "an assertion by a door-to-door solicitor that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a state or its subdivisions to
deprive a specialist in door-to-door selling of his means of livelihood." Id. at 632. The
Court was clear in distinguishing between the "commerce, ie., sales of periodicals" and the
"methods" which were subject to regulation, concluding that "even a legitimate occupation
may be restricted or prohibited in the public interest." Id. at 632-33.
177. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
178. See notes 157-64 and accompanying text supra.
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of the United States of 4merica in Congress assembled, That
this Act may be cited as the "Telephone Privacy Act".
Sec. 2 Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sec-
tion:
PROHIBITION OF UNSOLICITED TELEPHONE
CALLS
Sec. 224. (a)(1)(A) No person may make or cause to be
made any unsolicited telephone call to any telephone if the
person who is the subscriber for such telephone has given no-
tice, in accordance with subsection (b), that he does not wish
to receive unsolicited telephone calls.
(B) No person shall cause to be made any unsolicited tel-
ephone call to any telephone if such call is made entirely by
automatic equipment or if such call is placed by automatic
equipment.
(2) No person may employ, or contract for, any other
person to make any telephone call in violation of paragraph
(1).
(b)(1) Any person who is a telephone subscriber and who
wishes not to receive unsolicited telephone calls may notify
the telephone company which provides telephone exchange
service for such telephone that he does not wish to receive
such calls. The Commission shall prescribe regulations-
(A) specifying the manner in which notification shall be
given,
(B) specifying the manner in which telephone companies
shall make available to persons making unsolicited tel-
ephone calls the names and telephone numbers of per-
sons who do not wish to receive such calls, and
(C) specifying the times at which and manner in which a
subscriber may give or revoke such notification.
Regulations under subparagraph (C) shall require that a sub-.
scriber be given the opportunity to give such notification
whenever a telephone is installed, and not less frequently than
annually thereafter.
(2) No telephone company may make any charge to a
subscriber for the service of listing him or her as not wishing
to receive unsolicited telephone calls, and the costs incurred
by any telephone company to administer the provisions of this
section shall be borne by those persons or institutions ob-
taining the names and telephone numbers of those subscribers
who do not wish to receive unsolicited telephone calls under a
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fee structure to be prescribed by regulation of the Commis-
sion. 179
Under the proposed model, telephone companies would initially
be required to provide a listing of subscribers unwilling to receive tele-
phone solicitations of any kind. This feature would allow each sub-
scriber to determine whether or not he wished to receive solicitations,
just as the homeowner in Struthers, rather than the government, had to
be allowed to choose whether or not to admit solicitors. Second, the
solicitors would be required to use the lists compiled by the telephone
company, just as mail solicitors must use the lists compiled by the Post-
master under Rowan. This would ensure that subscribers' wishes were
heeded by solicitors. Third, as in the congressional proposal, the solici-
tor would pay for the use of the list, in effect reimbursing the telephone
company for its service. This aspect of the Model would prevent the
subscribing public from subsidizing the cost of exercising its preroga-
tive not to be disturbed. Fourth, because the legislation does not make
a classification for commercial speech, it is not vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge on First Amendment content-neutrality grounds. It
may be argued that there may be individuals who wish to receive non-
commercial calls, but not commercial calls, who will be forced to
choose between all calls or none. Statistics compiled in the survey for
the Pacific Telephone Company, 80 however, indicate that this is un-
likely: only .2% of subscribers polled stated that they liked calls solicit-
ing charitable donations,' 8 ' and 1.1% stated that they liked receiving
calls of a religious nature.' 82 For purposes of comparison, .1% liked
receiving wrong numbers, 3 and .4% liked receiving crank calls.
84
A legislative model that would restrict all residential telephone so-
licitations of those who have indicated their unwillingness to be dis-
turbed, as set out above, fulfills the four requirements established in
O'Brien for the regulation of speech through time, place and manner
restrictions. 85 First, restriction of telephone solicitation is within the
constitutional power of the government. 8 6 Second, it furthers the
strong governmental interest in protecting the right of residential pri-
vacy. The strength of this interest emerges from an analysis of legisla-
179. The bill might also include guidelines for enforcement. See. e.g., H.R. 9506, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
180. Field Research Corp., The California Public's Experience with and Attitude To-
ward Unsolicited Telephone Calls at 9 (Mar. 1978) (survey conducted for the Pacific Tele-





185. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
186. The telephone, as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, falls under the regula-
tory power of the federal government.
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tion enacted, and subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, to
restrict other media from penetrating the home. 87 Third, the interest
in restricting telephone solicitation is not related to suppressing free
expression. It centers instead on the need to protect the home from
specific, unwanted intrusions.' Finally, there is at present no other
effective means by which to restrict such calls.' 9 The proposed model
therefore does not limit freedom of speech more than is necessary to
achieve its legitimate goal. Thus, the proposed model meets the stan-
dards set out in O'Brien for restricting unwanted residential telephone
solicitation.
The proposed model has the advantages of complying with all the
established constitutional requirements and of effectively eliminating
telephone solicitations from the homes of those unwilling to receive
them. Telephone solicitations are restricted only as a manner of com-
munication under the proposed model, while the speech itself is not.
The speaker may deliver his message via any other media (e.g., televi-
sion, radio, newspapers, or magazines). The calls are also restricted
only as toplace. Although the calls cannot be made to a residence, the
speaker may deliver his message in any other setting (e.g., businesses,
clubs, agencies and associations). 90 Calls to residences are not pre-
cluded altogether. Those who do not wish to receive solicitations may
so indicate, thus meeting the requirements established by the Court in
analogous residential privacy cases.' The willing recipient is free to
receive whatever solicitation he desires, and the unwilling recipient
may, by his own initiative and discretion, indicate his unwillingness to
receive solicitations. The proposed model does not distinguish com-
mercial and noncommercial speech, in conformity with the content-
neutrality doctrine, and, therefore, is not vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. Finally, the model would eliminate the use of ADRMPs
from the telephone solicitation industry. Thus, the proposed model ap-
pears to be the best, if not the only, viable solution to the problem of
the intrusion of telephone solicitation into the home.
187. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948), notes 76-83 and accompanying text
supra.
188. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), notes 108-13 and accompany-
ing text supra.
189. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
190. Calls are not subject to time regulations under the proposed model in addition to
place and manner regulations, because such restriction would not fully serve the governmen-
tal interest of protecting residential privacy.
191. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1969); see text accompanying notes 121-
28 supra. PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); see text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); see text accompanying notes 108-18 supra. Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948); see text accompanying notes 60-67 supra. Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1942), see text accompanying notes 101-07 supra.
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Conclusion
The constitutional rights of free speech and privacy are involved in
regulating telephone solicitation. The cases examined above have em-
phasized that the two rights frequently conflict, and that neither can be
permitted to eclipse the other. No one has a right to speak anywhere, at
any time and in any manner he chooses. Similarly, no one can claim a
right of privacy which encompasses wherever, whenever and however
he chooses to move through society. Both rights must be tempered to
achieve compatibility with respect to interests that are ultimately coun-
tervailing. The tempering factor is a time, place and manner regula-
tion, one that establishes one right as preeminent only in a given
context. It is the thesis of this note that in the context of the home, the
privacy interest of the resident should prevail over the countervailing
right of a speaker to deliver an unwanted message over the telephone.
While the speaker has the right of free expression, he may not use it to
disturb the solitude of a resident who has expressed his desire not to be
disturbed. The message may nonetheless be delivered by other means,
in other settings.
The constitutional doctrine of residential privacy protects against
unwanted intrusions when specific criteria are met. Just as he must
indicate to the Postmaster his unwillingness to receive mail solicitations
under Rowan, the resident must indicate to the telephone company his
unwillingness to receive solicitations by telephone. The proposed
model would establish a means by which the subscriber may limit ac-
cess to his telephone, consistent with constitutional requirements, since
both commercial and noncommercial speech are subject to time, place
and manner restrictions.
The argument that a limitation on the right of free speech is an
impermissible "encroachment" on constitutional rights fails to recog-
nize that the Court has consistently recognized time, place and manner
regulations as a legitimate device to mold the parameters of that right
to its surroundings. Moreover, from the perspective of this note, the
impermissible "encroachment" is that which affects the privacy inter-
ests of the resident rather than the First Amendment interests of solici-
tors.
The privacy of the individual, particularly in his home, is a right
only recently recognized and not easily defined. As technology ad-
vances, "encroachments" become more evident. Regulation of tele-
phone solicitation is necessary to protect the resident from such
intrusions and to counteract technology's most recent method of com-
munication by which an unwanted message may enter the home.
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